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 Abstract 
In Italy, affirmative actions or gender quotas, especially in regard to political representation, began to 
be matters of public and political debate in 1995, when the Constitutional Court deemed illegitimate, 
and therefore annulled, the provisions of the 1993 electoral law introducing corrective systems for 
equal representation between men and women at national and regional level. Since then, the issue of 
ensuring equal access to elective offices has been constantly on the political agenda.  The ongoing 
debate about the electoral reform for the Chamber of Deputies (named Italicum,) promoted by the 
President Renzi,  may represent the last opportunity to introduce gender quotas for national elections. 
The paper aims to provide an historical overview of the Italian debate on gender quotas, by 
investigating the last two decades events and answering the following questions: what conditions and 
processes have facilitated the adoption of gender quotas? Are there areas in which it is (has been) 
easier to adopt gender quotas? What resistances – and raised by whom – have hindered their spread 
through policy field and levels of government?  Why gender quotas are far from been considered a 
legitimate instrument for gender equality? 
Keywords 
Electoral gender quotas, economic gender quotas, European Parliament, national and regional 
elections, Constitutional Court   
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 1 
Introduction 
In Italy, affirmative actions or gender quotas, especially in regard to political representation, began to 
be matters of public and political debate in 1995, when the Constitutional Court deemed illegitimate, 
and therefore annulled, the provisions of the 1993 electoral law introducing corrective systems for 
equal representation between men and women at national and regional level. Since then, with the 
publication in 1999 of Donne in quota by Bianca Beccalli (a university lecturer and feminist activist), 
the issue of ensuring equal access to elective offices has been constantly on the political agenda. 
However, it has been contested, on the one hand, by part of historical Italian feminism opposed to 
artificial systems of representation that, it is claimed, penalize the differences and merits of women to 
the advantage of a single model of male derivation; and on the other by the male political class, which 
has long monopolized decision-making arenas in both politics and other domains.  It is of great 
significance that still lacking today is a law containing measures for equal gender representation in 
national parliamentary elections. Such measures are left to the will of the ruling class and therefore to 
self-regulation by individual parties (to add, that mainly left-wing parties recognized gender quotas in 
their statutes). It might represent a turning point the government proposal for the adoption of a new 
electoral system for the Chamber formation (named Italicum), currently under discussion in the Italian 
Parliament and whose approval is expected by the end of May 2015. After a protracted and divisive 
political debate (it started in January 2014) the bill has been reviewed by female MP to contain 
specific measures for promoting female political representation (party list gender quotas and gender 
preferences). At the time of writing, the President Renzi has urged the political parties in Parliament to 
approve soon the bill (there will be the second and last reading by the Chamber in April), together 
with the constitutional reform that aims to secure a process of rationalization of the Italian 
Parliament’s structure and functions. After twenty years from their abolition, it seems that a clear 
political will has emerged for gender quotas to be reintroduced for the national parliamentary election.   
In order to understand and evaluate the current debate on gender quota we need to consider the last 
two decades and answering the following questions: what conditions and processes have facilitated the 
adoption of gender quotas? Are there areas in which it is (has been) easier to adopt gender quotas? 
What resistances – and raised by whom – have hindered their spread through policy field and levels of 
government?  
To answer these questions, the paper in the first Section will recall the historical phases through which 
equal gender representation has moved onto the agenda; how the issue of measures for greater female 
representation has been addressed; what discourses and rhetorics have been predominant; and what 
actors or group of actors have acted in favour or against the adoption of tools for an egalitarian 
democracy. In the second Section the activity of the judiciary branch will be considered and 
emphasized how relevant has been the substantial change in doctrine for the establishment of gender 
quota legitimacy. In the conclusions, it will be outlined the main results.   
The history of gender quotas, between adoption and resistance  
If they are lacking for the national election (Brunelli 2006), by contrast, in most recent years gender 
quotas have been adopted or confirmed in the following three areas: the composition of the boards of 
public and stock-exchange listed companies (law no. 120/2011); the composition of electoral lists for 
local government elections (law no. 215/2012) and the composition of electoral lists for European 
Parliament elections (renewed in 2014 with law no. 65/2014).  
The following table provides an historical overview of the legislative and constitutional provisions 
favouring access to public offices by women. 
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Table 1: Summary of Italy’s legislative and constitutional reforms on women’s access to elected 
offices and company boards 
Laws Election Specific provision 
State laws nos. 3/1993 and 
43/1993 (declared  
unconstitutional in 1995)   
Local and regional 
elections  
No more than 2/3 candidates of the 
same sex on the lists 
State law no. 277/1993 
(declared unconstitutional 
in 1995)   
Election of the Chamber of 
Deputies  
Alternation of men and women 
candidates on the lists 
Constitutional law no. 
3/2001 
Article 117, paragraph 7, of 
the Constitution  
“Regional laws have to…promote equal 
access of men and women to elective 
office” 
Constitutional law no. 
1/2003 
Article 51 of the 
Constitution 
“The Republic adopts specific measures 
in order to promote equal opportunities 
for men and women”   
State law no. 90/2004 European Parliament 
elections  
No more than 2/3 candidates of the 
same sex on the lists 
State law no. 165/2004 Principles on regional 
elections  
No rule on women’s representation  
State law no. 270/2005 National Parliament 
Elections 
No rule on women’s representation 
Regional law no. 1/2005 Calabria Region Candidates of both sexes on the lists 
Some regional Laws 
(2004-05) 
Other Regions (Sicily, 
Sardinia, Province of 
Trento and Bolzano, Val 
d’Aosta, Lazio, Puglia, 
Toscana, Campania, 
Marche)   
No more than 2/3 candidates of the 
same sex on the lists 
Regional law no. 226/2007 Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Region  
No more than 60 per cent of candidates 
of the same sex on the lists 
State law no. 120/2011 Public and private board 
composition  
No more than 2/3 members of the same 
sex on the board  
State law no. 215/2012 Local elections  No more than 2/3 candidates of the 
same sex on the lists; double gender 
preference 
State law no. 65/2014  European Parliament 
elections  
Candidates of both sexes on the lists; 
triple gender preference.  
Source: Palici di Suni (2012: 387), my compilation 
Before entering in the details of each piece of law, we underline the fact that according to the 
consolidated legislative frame, gender parity in Italy means the goal of 33% of representation, as in the 
cases of local and European elections where the law prescribes that no more than 2/3 candidates of the 
same sex should be in the party lists.   
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The Electoral Law of 1993 and quotas  
A system of gender quotas for national parliamentary elections was first introduced in Italy during 
discussion in 1993 on a semi-majoritarian electoral system to replace the ‘pure’ proportional system in 
place for more than forty years and to transform the so-called ‘consensual democracy with ideological 
cleavages’ (i.e., the polarization between a communist bloc and an anti-communist bloc) of the First 
Republic (period 1948-1993) towards a competitive logic of functioning based on political alternation 
(Fabbrini 2001; 2009). In a context of political and economic crisis, and a consequent loss of 
legitimacy by the male political ruling class, there opened space for the activity and influence of two 
eminent women able to build a cross-political alliance: Tina Anselmi (Democrazia Cristiana) then 
president of the Equal Opportunities Commission at the Prime Minister’s Office, and Livia Turco, a 
deputy and active campaigner for the rights of women (Democratici di Sinistra). During the 
parliamentary debate, a split opened between the centre-left parties, traditionally close to the feminist 
movement and its claims, and the centre-right parties, which viewed gender quotas as a system 
resembling one to protect an endangered species – for instance, the panda. The slogan of the rightist 
women – “We are not pandas” – received wide media coverage and obtained broad public consensus. 
It thus fuelled a dominant cultural stance contrary to any system promoting the greater presence of 
women in politics. Nonetheless, the provision on quotas was approved, also because many male 
parliamentarians were aware that the Constitutional Court would certainly reject the measure (which 
in fact happened).  
The law stated that 75% of seats were to be assigned with a majoritarian electoral system and 25% 
with a proportional one. A clause established that, for the 155 (out of 630) proportionally elected seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies, the lists of candidates should be composed of both sexes in alternating 
order (zipping). As the political debate proceeded, the women’s movement was still fragmented. The 
feminist autonomous groups and cultural centres of difference feminism – though uninterested in 
politics – opposed the quota system on the grounds that it ratified the weakness of women and their 
subordination to men. By contrast, the more politically integrated part of the movement - closer to the 
parties on the left - was in favour of the greater representation of women, but it was divided on how to 
achieve it: besides quotas, there could be measures like political training for aspiring female 
politicians, the internal regulation of the parties, non-sexist media communication, or the creation of a 
database of female candidacies (Guadagnini 2005). Because of these internal divisions, female 
political representation did not enter the public agenda but remained largely a matter for ‘insiders’ (i.e 
women in the institutions). The media contributed to the negative connotation associated with the 
quota system. They described it as a corporative measure, a dispute among the few women with seats 
in parliament, and in general an issue marginal with respect to the more important debate on the 
electoral reform intended to establish a new model of democracy (the so-called Second Republic). 
Finally to be noted is the absence of a cultural debate (in the media and in the academia) informing the 
public about the reasons that had led to the adoption of anti-discriminatory measures in parliament, 
and furnishing a more comparative and international account of  equal representation (Guadagnini 
2003). Consequently, the quotas came into effect without adequate knowledge about them and without 
substantial political and civil legitimacy.   
As was expected in several quarters (the parties), the quota system for parliament (and the elections of 
municipal and provincial councils) was short-lived. In 1995 a ruling by the Constitutional Court (no. 
422/1995 of 12 September 1995) declared that the measures introduced for female political 
representation were unconstitutional. Instead – according to the Court – affirmative actions were 
admissible in the economic and social spheres (see Section 2, for the distinction – drawn by the ruling 
– between formal and substantial equality with reference to article 3 of the Constitution).   
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2001 and 2003 constitutional reforms  
In order to remedy shortcomings in constitutional legitimacy, in 2001 the Title V of the Constitution 
was modified to arrange the relationship and the division of competences between the state and 
regions towards a federal state system. The modifications made to article 117 recognized regional-
level quotas as legitimate (law 3/2001 of October 18 2001: The new wording of Article 117, paragraph 
7, of the Constitution stated that “[r]egional laws have to remove all obstacles which prevent the full 
equality of men and women in social, cultural, and economic life, and promote equal access of men 
and women to elective offices; Carlassare 2002)”. The reform was carried forward by the centre-left 
government headed by Romano Prodi. A paradox was apparent at constitutional level: whilst 
legitimated for the regional level were possible measures for affirmative action, at the level of central 
government the situation was unchanged (so that such measures remained inadmissible). 
The constitutional reform was extended to the central level two years later, when in 2003 modification 
of article 51 of the Constitution was approved (law no. 1/2003 of 12 June 2003. The provision added 
to Article 51 specified that “the Republic adopts specific measures in order to promote equal chances 
for men and women”; it explicitly allows for the insertion of gender-based affirmative action measures 
into electoral legislation, similar to those introduced in 1993 and declared unconstitutional in 1995). 
Following this change, the objective of substantial gender equality was legitimated through the 
possibility to introduce affirmative actions for the under-represented sex also in areas other than 
economic and social. The change was approved under the centre-right government headed by Silvio 
Berlusconi.  
The political debate was strongly influenced by the example of France, where an amendment similar 
to article 51 had already been approved, and by the European Union (approval of the 2000 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and international organizations (United Nations and the 
Council of Europe). Political support for the constitutional reform was thus built on the basis of 
arguments and experiences borrowed from elsewhere (Guadagnini 2005).   
Also on this occasion the reform was enacted without any public debate. The women’s movement 
remained on the margins. It did so voluntarily since it was little interested in equal representation 
within a system that it deemed patriarchal and therefore to be rejected. The only women to apply 
pressures and to act to raise awareness were those in parliament, who set about constructing cross-
party alliances. Once again, the women’s movement was fragmented: on the one side was the 
integrated movement (elected women, femocrats, women activists, experts, associations) which 
participated in the debate; on the other was the ‘difference feminism’ movement, which kept out of the 
discussion and indeed boycotted it. Therefore lacking were the factors most important for the adoption 
of gender quotas: consensus and alliance between women in the movement and women in politics 
(Krook 2009; Lovenduski 2008). In Italy, owing to the lack of cohesion in the feminist movement 
(Della Porta 2003) and the technical nature of the issue, the latter did not receive the same level of 
visibility and mobilization as other political initiatives (divorce, abortion, violence against women).  
The lack of civil society support together with the lack of political will may be the explanatory factors 
behind the Italian late in introducing gender quota system at national level. The contradictory 
sequence of constitutional reforms – first the amendment relative to the regions and then the general 
amendment – reflected a weakness of political will (Palici di Suni 2012). As we have seen, the first 
reform was approved by a centre-left government, and the second by a centre-right one. Both 
governments needed (in front of the other European partners and of the Cedaw committee) to appear 
committed to an improved gender balance in politics. So we may define the 2003 constitutional reform 
a case of symbolic reform, ‘which occurs when policy designed to address certain social problems fail 
to effectively solve these problems.  Often, before symbolic policies are even formalized, decision 
makers, more interested in image making than problem solving, design policy statement with no teeth’ 
(Mazur1996, p. 2). Moreover, the approval came, not after wide-ranging domestic debate, but mainly 
through emulation of neighbouring countries and absorption of international indications.   
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In fact, when the time came to implement the constitutional reform and therefore to approve an 
electoral law on gender quotas, the political will of the parties (or better, of the party males) failed. 
Some members of parliament, among them women, belonging to the rightist and leftist parties 
contended that women had no need of quotas and therefore opposed their adoption; other members 
continued to consider quotas as unconstitutional, despite the reform of article 51.  For years, numerous 
draft bills were never tabled, and on the only two occasions (in 2005 with the electoral reform 
intended to introduce a proportional system with a majority premium, and in 2014 during the ongoing 
debate on the new electoral reform law termed ‘Italicum’, see below) when bills reached the 
parliamentary chambers, they were rejected by the votes of a cross-party political majority (Donà 
2007).   
Legislation for European Parliament elections (2004) 
Approved in the meantime was legislation for the European Parliament elections (law no. 90/2004 of 8 
April 2004 which established a 2/3 quota in the party candidate lists) valid for the elections of 2006 
and the 2010. As an effect of the quotas, female representation doubled in the two electoral rounds 
from 11% in 2006 to 22% in 2010. The legislation was renewed and strengthened as regards gender 
equality measures in 2014 (see below for details).  
At regional level, recent years have seen the haphazard adoption of a variety of Statute and laws 
introducing a list party quota and/or double gender preference system; measures that in some cases 
have been contested by the central government (to note, always lead by a centre-right coalition) for 
their supposed illegitimacy, but have nevertheless passed scrutiny by the Constitutional Court and 
therefore been declared legitimate (see Section 2 for more details). Since the 2001 constitutional 
reform by which the regions gained new competence in the area of gender political equality was the 
result of the centre-left reformism, it might be that the right-wing government recurred the 
Constitutional Court against the regional laws in order to nullify – unsuccessfully- the regional 
competence, and then the unwanted 2001 Constitutional reform.  
Composition of the boards of stock-market listed and state-controlled companies (2011) 
Introduced in 2011, after a tortuous passage through parliament (Donà 2012), were provisions which 
established a 30% gender quota on the second renewal of a company board’s mandate. This was a 
clear success for the mobilization and alliance among women in politics, women in the feminist 
movement, and women managers in industry (Saraceno 2011). It was accompanied by lively public 
and academic promoting the increasing presence of the so-called ‘woman factor’ (Fattore D) in the 
economy as a driver of economic growth (Ferrera 2006; Casarico and Profeta 2010). This argument 
proved effective in neutralizing resistances and obstacles against the measure’s approval, in a country 
undergoing severe economic crisis.  
The Italian law on gender quotas on the boards of listed and state-owned companies was approved by 
parliament on 12 July 2011. Published in the Official Gazette on 28 July 2011, it became effective one 
year later (August 2012). The law consists of three articles, the first of which (Gender balance on the 
boards of listed companies) specifies the amendments required to introduce the gender quotas 
envisaged by the consolidated text on financial intermediation (legislative decree of 24 February 
1998), particularly in articles 147 (Administration bodies) and 148 (Control bodies). The second 
article (Entry into force) concerns the times (one year after enactment of the law) and phases of 
application of the gender quota provision (fixed for the first board mandate at 20% and from the 
second onwards at 30%). The third article (State-controlled companies) specifies that the dispositions 
on gender balance in corporate bodies also apply to state-controlled companies. The provision applies 
to three renewals of boards of directors and, given that mandates generally have a three-year duration, 
means that the law will be in force for nine years. The law provides that, on renewal of the board’s 
first mandate, the gender quota shall be 20%, and 30% in the second and third mandates (therefore 
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from 2018). The law is addressed to a series of private and public actors, in particular the 272 listed 
companies which before the law had 6.9% of women on their boards of directors and the 2076 state-
controlled companies with around 13,500 board members and a 4.3% female presence. These are 
therefore highly significant figures, and the main implication of the law is simply that for each woman 
who enters there will be a man who loses his post. This is consequently a zero-sum game, with an 
evident initial situation of male monopoly on boards which the quota system should eliminate.  In the 
event that a company disregards the gender quota requirement, for the first mandate a letter of caution 
is issued, which may be followed in the case of further non-compliance by a fine ranging from 10 
thousand to 1 million euros. If the non-compliance continues in subsequent mandates, the board of 
directors will be dissolved. The supervisory authority in the case of listed companies is Consob 
[Antitrust Agency], while in the case of state-controlled companies is the Department for Equal 
Opportunities.  The female share in corporate boards has increased considerably to 11.0% in 2012 
(from 2% in 2003) even if still remains clearly below the EU27 average of 16.0%. Moreover, the share 
of women in different management positions in large companies and SMEs reached 35.0% in 2010 
(from 22.0% in 2003) and now lies above the EU27 average of 33.0%. Thus, the challenge remains to 
establish gender equality in Italy's business environment and its economic decision-making positions 
not only in corporate management positions, but also in board positions (EC 2013: 12). 
Legislation for municipal elections (2012) 
Approved during 2012 were quota systems for the election of local councils and executives (law no. 
215/2012 on municipal elections). Law no. 215 of 23 November 2012 introduced provisions intended 
to establish gender balances in local administrations. 
First modified was the legislation on municipal council elections. For municipalities with more than 
5,000 inhabitants, the law, resuming a model already experienced with the regional electoral law of 
Campania, established two measures: 
 the so-called ‘list quota’: neither of the two sexes may represent more than two-thirds of the 
candidates on electoral lists; moreover, only in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants 
can failure to respect the quota entail annulment of the list; 
 introduction of the so-called ‘double gender preference’ allowing the voter to express two 
preferences (rather than one as foreseen by the previous legislation) provided that the 
preferences concern candidates of different sex; if not, the second preference is annulled. 
For all municipalities with up to 15,000 inhabitants, however, the lists of the candidates must ensure 
the representation of both sexes. 
Secondly, the mayor and the president of the province must appoint an executive in compliance with 
the principle of equal opportunities between women and men, ensuring the presence of both sexes. 
Moreover, municipal and provincial statutes must establish rules that ‘guarantee’, and no longer 
simply ‘promote’, the presence of both sexes in the executive and in the non-elected collegial bodies 
of the municipality and province, as well as of the agencies and institutions dependent on them.  
Since the introduction of the rules, there has been a significant growth of female representation in 
municipal bodies at the level of both councils and executives. In particular, the law has led to an 
18.9% increase in women elected to the councils of municipalities that have applied the new law 
compared with those elected when the law was not in force. This effect has been stronger in the 
regions of the South, where the initial percentage of elected women was lower, so that the law may 
have had a greater effect. This result confirms that the double gender preference system has achieved 
the legislator’s objective of balancing gender representation in municipal councils. At the same time, 
voters have responded positively to its introduction. Moreover, an indirect effect of the law has been  
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a 14% increase in women appointed as members of local government. In municipalities with fewer 
than 15,000 inhabitants, the mayor can choose components of the executive (assessori) only from 
persons elected to the municipal council. This result can therefore be interpreted as a relative increase 
in the importance of women in the internal dynamics of local politics. 
To be stressed is that there are numerous municipal and provincial statutes that require the more 
gender-balanced composition of executives. Yet, for many years, these rules – like revised article 51 
of the Constitution – have remained dead letters. But the administrative judges have re-established the 
principle of legality by dissolving executives formed exclusively of men and ordering mayors and 
provincial presidents to re-form them with the requisite gender balance. Which once again 
demonstrates the importance of the courts in promoting gender equality.  
 
European Parliament elections (2014) 
Last in order of time has been the introduction of affirmative actions for European Parliament 
elections (law no. 65/2014 of 22 April 2014).  The current legislation stipulate (from 2019 onwards) 
the following: 
 the paritarian composition of electoral lists, requiring that no more than half of the candidates 
should be of the same sex, otherwise the list shall be declared inadmissible; moreover, the first 
two candidates must be of different sexes; 
 triple gender preference, with a discipline more incisive than the transitional rules for 2014: the 
preferences, in fact, should concern candidates of different sex not only in the case of three 
preferences, but also in the case of two. If two preferences are expressed for candidates of the 
same sex, the second preference is annulled; if three preferences are expressed, both the second 
and the third preference are annulled (and not just the third preference, as in the rules for 2014). 
Nevertheless, the law modifying the electoral law for the 2014 European elections has changed 
nothing. In fact, introduced for the elections of May 2014 was the possibility to express a third 
preference, with the stipulation that this must pertain to a gender different from the other two; 
otherwise the third preference is annulled. This means that that there is nothing to prevent voting for 
two men. The affirmative actions will only come into effect in 2019, when 50% of the candidates will 
be women, and the preferences expressed must be for candidates of different genders.  
Gender quotas have been postponed to the 2019 elections in order not to undermine the extra-
parliamentary agreement between Renzi and Berlusconi on the ‘Italicum’ electoral law. The female 
PD senators who promoted the bill in parliament had to surrender to internal resistance and settle for a 
compromise text. The law was passed in the Senate with 155 votes in favour, 58 against, and 15 
abstentions, with the favourable votes cast by the PD, NCD and FI and the votes against by M5S, 
Scelta Civica and SEL (which did not participate in the vote). The argument put forward by the 
political parties was that the next elections of May 25 were too close to include such disruptive 
mechanisms in  the formation of the electoral lists. Indeed, mediation ensure maintenance of the PD-
NCD-FI agreement on electoral matters. Once again, the feminist movement remained on the margins, 
while indifference prevailed in public opinion.   
Despite the postponement of gender quotas to the 2019 elections, the results of the 2014 European 
elections recorded a doubling of female representation (40% of the 73 seats allocated to Italy were 
won by women, compared with a European average of 30%).  
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The Debate on ‘Italicum’ and Gender Quotas 
With the formation in February 2014 of the new grand coalition government (based on an agreement 
between the Partito Democratico and the Nuovo Centro Destra) headed by Matteo Renzi, the issue of 
electoral reforms moved onto the political agenda. The proposal – called ‘Italicum’ – that fuelled 
parliamentary and political debate stemmed from the agreement between the Partito Democratico and 
Forza Italia (known to the media as the ‘Nazareno Pact’ after the meeting between Renzi and 
Berlusconi held at the PD headquarters in via Nazareno, Rome, on 18 January 2014). The 
parliamentary debate on the Italicum is still in progress, having so far been passed through the first 
reading stage of the so called Italian ‘navetta system’ (at the end of the floor voting in one chamber, 
the text is sent to the other legislative branch for approval, and in case of revisions it turns back to the 
previous chamber and has to be voted again). When first reading and voting was held in the Chamber 
(on 10 March 2014), various proposals for the introduction of a quota system for electoral lists were 
rejected. The original text of the Italicum states that 50% of the candidates on an electoral list should 
be women; the problem is that it does not require the genders to be alternate. In practice, this may 
mean that the names at the top of the list – those of the candidates most likely to be elected, depending 
on the percentage of the vote – could all be male. Whence, according to many, derives the necessity of 
specifying how the party lists should be compiled in order to ensure parity between men and women.  
Although the gender quota measures were supported by an alliance of women MPs of the centre right 
and centre left, upon their first reading in the Chamber, on 10 March, they were rejected by secret 
ballot. The amendments in favour of gender parity had been put forward by members of the PD and 
had received cross-party support: in total, 90 female deputies belonging to Forza Italia, Partito 
Democratico, Sinistra e Libertà, Scelta Civica, and Nuovo Centro Destra. The secret ballot requested 
by Forza Italia thus enabled rejection of the amendments by members of Forza Italia and a minority 
of the PD (100 deputies), to which were added the votes of the M5S against the quotas. When the bill 
was then discussed in the Senate, female senators presented the amendments in favour of quotas and 
on 27 January of 2015 voting floor approved the bill. Now the revised text is waiting for the second 
reading by the Chamber. The text approved by the Senate introduced amendments concerning party 
list composition (no more than 50% of candidates of the same sex), order (the same sex should not be 
present in the list for more than two consecutive times) and party leaders (no more than 60% of party 
leaders of the same sex), together with double gender preferences as introduced at regional level. 
To be stressed, however, is the marked discontinuity of the Renzi Government with respect to past 
ones in Italy’s republican history (Sarlo and Zajczyk 2012; see the figure 1 below). For the first time, a 
government executive is balanced from the gender point of view (8 women and 8 men) with women 
heading crucial ministries (foreign policy, defence, economic development, health, universities and 
research, administrative simplification, institutional reforms, and regional affairs). Given this apparent 
commitment to the presence of women in decision-making bodies, prime-minister Renzi has not 
deemed it necessary to appoint a special Minister for Equal Opportunities between man and women. 
And in confirming his commitment to participation of women, Renzi – as secretary of the PD – has 
decided to nominate only women as the top candidates on the lists for the 2014 European elections, 
thus already applying the rules that will enter into force in 2019. 
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Fig. 1: Gender representation in the governments (prime minister + ministers) of republican Italy 
(1948-2014) 
 
 
Legal Doctrine and constitutional jurisprudence evolution on gender quotas 
What are the normative and legal issues raised by the adoption of gender quotas? How were they 
solved? With what consequences for the implementation of gender quotas?  When reviewing the case-
law of the Constitutional Court concerning article 51 on formal equality
1
, we saw that the 
Constitutional Court did declare all the measures introduced to ensure more gender balance during the 
1990s to be unconstitutional: in judgement no. 422/1995 of 12 September 1995, confirming the 
important role of the courts in the implementation of gender quotas. In the Court’s view, Article 51 of 
the Constitution, which provides for equal access by women and men to public and elective offices, 
had an absolute value, meaning that equality does not permit any gender consideration or 
differentiation in politics. In this judgement, the Court emphasised that the political rights of every 
citizen are absolute rights that cannot be limited in favour of citizens belonging to a disadvantaged 
group (Palici di Suni 2012). In a previous judgment (no. 109/1993 of 26 March 1993), the 
Constitutional Court ruled that affirmative action in the economic and social fields was constitutional; 
                                                     
1
 This part is based on the information collected by the Senate Service Study in the Dossier ‘Rappresentanza di genere e 
cariche elettive’ available at http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/DOSSIER/751732/index.html?part=dossier_ 
dossier1-sezione_sezione11-h1_h13; last access: 1 April 2015).  
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and in judgement 422/1995 the Court specified that affirmative actions and special measures are 
admissible only in the economic realm, not in the political one.  
The Court's opinion reflected the doctrine of the twofold meaning of the equality principle, with 
Article 3.1 prescribing formal equality and Article 3.2 prescribing substantive equality. In accordance 
with that doctrine, substantive equality should be an exception to formal equality, from which, as a 
general rule, the legislation may not derogate with regard to political representation. In its decision of 
1995, the Constitutional Court states: “Any differentiation on grounds of sex cannot but be 
discriminatory, in that it diminishes for some citizens the concrete content of a fundamental right in 
favour of other citizens belonging to a group deemed  disadvantaged.” 
A second decision to be recalled is judgement no. 49/2003, in which the Court pronounced as 
groundless the question of the legitimacy of the electoral rules of the Valle d’Aosta region, which 
required the presence of both sexes on every electoral list of candidates. According to the government, 
which applied for their abolition, such measures would jeopardize the electoral rights of citizens of 
both sexes. Here the interpretation differs, and one notes a change of perspective recognized by the 
Court itself “in light of a constitutional frame of reference that has evolved with respect to the one 
current at the time of the 1995 pronouncement, in particular the constitutional laws 2/2001 and 2003”. 
At that time, the Constitutional Court, after presentation of the new text of article 117 Cost., but prior 
to the amendment of article 51 Cost., specified that the constraints imposed by the law to achieve 
gender balance in political representation must not affect “the equality of chances among the 
candidates on the electoral lists” (judgement no. 49 of 2003). 
Finally to be recalled is judgement no. 4/2010 pertaining to the electoral law of the Campania region 
and its provisions concerning the double gender preference and the 2/3 quota in electoral lists. The 
State had challenged the regional law on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. In this case, too, the 
Court confirmed the legitimacy of the measures adopted in favour of female representation. It declared 
that “norms such as the one subject to the present judgement can only furnish voters with further 
possibilities of choice; but they do not guarantee – nor could they – that the objective has been 
achieved, for still widespread cultural and social resistances may frustrate the intent of the regional 
legislator, perpetuating the existing situation, which exhibits an evident gender imbalance in 
representation both in the Campania regional government and, generally, in the elective assemblies of 
the Italian Republic. The uncertainty of the result demonstrates that the censured norm envisages, not 
a constrictive mechanism, but solely a promotional one, in the spirit of the above-cited constitutional 
and statutory provisions.”   
Still applying, therefore, is the principle that “apparently not consistent with the purposes of the 
second paragraph of article 3 are measures that do not seek to remove the obstacles that prevent 
women from achieving particular outcomes, but directly grant those same outcomes to women" (Corte 
Cost. sent. no. 422 of 1995; no. 49 of 2003; no. 4 of 2010). Whilst in elections, affirmative actions 
would conflict with fundamental principles of the Italian constitution and the inalienable rights of 
individuals, in the economic-social sphere “the compensation of inequalities” is not only allowed but 
becomes “immediately operative under art. 3, paragraph 2, Cost.” (Corte Cost. sent. no. 109 of 1993) 
and necessary for the exercise of fundamental rights.  
When affirmative actions are intended to eliminate “situations of social and economic inferiority”, 
they are consistent with “the provisions of the second paragraph of article 3 of the Constitution in that 
their purpose is to remove the obstacles that impede the effective participation of all workers in the 
country’s economic and social organization” (Corte Cost. sent. no. 38 of 1960; Corte Cost. sent. no. 
88 of 1998), not only when they are simply intended “to raise the initial threshold among individuals” 
but also when they are intended directly to ensure an outcome.  
It is therefore possible to draw a first conclusion. The legitimacy of ‘strong’ affirmative actions 
changes according to the sphere of reference, and in relation to the rights and interests involved in a 
particular setting. In this regard, the Constitutional Court cites affirmative actions for female 
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entrepreneurship (law no. 215 of 25 February 1992) which, like law no. 120 of 2011, seek to remedy 
the evident gender imbalance in the socio-economic and business spheres. 
Indeed, when the Constitutional Court has evaluated the legitimacy of measures, which like law no. 
120 of 2011 have been intended to “redress or at any rate attenuate an evident imbalance to the 
disadvantage of women” in the economic and business system, it has evaluated  its legitimacy only in 
relation to the principle of substantial equality. In this case, the purpose of affirmative actions is not 
only to resolve “a manifest imbalance against persons of female sex” but also to eliminate 
“discriminations accumulated in the past owing to the predominance of particular social behaviours 
and cultural models which have favoured persons of male sex in occupying entrepreneurial or 
corporate positions”, as well as to “avert the risk that natural or biological differences change into 
social discrimination” (Corte Cost. sent. 109 of 1993). For the Constitutional Court, consequently, 
there is a difference in how affirmative actions in politics and affirmative actions in the economy are 
legally interpreted and judged.  
Conclusions 
The paper aimed to provide an historical overview of the Italian debate on gender quotas, which are 
far from been considered a legitimate instrument for gender equality. The Italian women suffered for a 
long time of citizenship exclusion (Mancini 2012), and despite the recognition of universal suffrage 
and formal equality still they experienced formal condition of discrimination in the workplace and in 
politics (Rossi-Doria 1996; Alasso 2012).   
Since the 1990s, mobilizations for gender quotas in politics have been sporadic, and mostly led by 
women in the institutions, rather than by women in society. After the Seventies, the Italian feminist 
movement is fragmented and with conflicting internal positions on the issue of gender quotas. The 
male dominated- political parties have thus been able to neutralize attempts to introduce such quota: as 
Saraceno (2012) writes, men in the political parties act as a ‘cartel’ whose purpose is to maintain a 
situation of monopoly. The only case when the mobilization has jointly involved both women in the 
institutions and the feminist movement it has been possible to overcome the obstacles raised by the 
parties and approve in 2011 gender quotas (in a more soft two-phase: 20% in 2012 and 30% in 2015, 
and not 30 % immediately)  in the economic sector.  
We may try to identify the enabling factors that make the adoption of quotas more likely. One of them 
is the area of application: all the various areas of government different from the central institutions 
(and therefore the regional government, the European parliament, the composition of public and 
private boards) are very likely to be subject to some affirmative action measure. Another enabling 
factor is the affirmation in the academic debate and the spread in civil society of scientific discourses 
in support of quotas (as in the case of economic decision-making bodies). Another enabling factor 
appears to be the alliance between women within and outside the institutions. Other possible 
institutional factors, like the presence or absence of a minister for equal opportunities, or contingent 
ones like the political and/or economic crisis, do not appear significant enough – taken individually – 
to foster the onset of a political discourse in favour of quotas in politics.  
The influence of other European countries, deeper and deeper within the European Union (EU), can 
support change at the cultural, political, and legal levels; such change could also ensure a less 
convoluted and more linear path to gender parity in Italy (Palici di Suni 2012).  Since the 1990s, the 
influence of the EU institutions (Guadagnini and Donà 2007) and the examples set by other European 
countries (especially France and Spain) have given rise to domestic constitutional and legislative 
reforms aimed at ensuring greater gender balance in politics, but their enactment exhibits many legal 
contradictions. These contradictions reflect – again – a lack of will on the part of political parties. 
High-sounding principles have been established, but the political consensus is not enough to turn those 
principles into more specific measures. Moreover, also the United Nations, and in particular the 
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CEDAW Committee, have periodically informed Italy of the inadequacy of the measures adopted for 
greater participation by women in the country’s political life. To date, such international 
recommendations have not given the women’s movement impetus to continue the battle for fair 
representation. In fact, Italy lacks a women’s movement attentive to multi-level dynamics and present 
in international arenas, or able to channel external pressures to induce the national government to 
undertake domestic reforms.  
The current political situation may represents a favourable condition for the return of electoral gender 
quota. After the 2013 elections, the Italian parliament recorded, with 31%, the highest percentage of 
women members in republican history. Moreover, the Renzi Government commitment for the 
modernization of Italy together with the absence of a real opposition may guarantee the necessary 
political support for promoting gender balance in politics.  So, surely the next two months will be 
crucial for understanding if and how the Chamber will approve the Italicum (with or without the 
amendments proposed by the Senate), and if the ‘pink quota’ (as named by the media in a derogatory 
way) will be finally intended as positive action for egalitarian democracy to all citizens (Beccalli e 
Falcinelli 2011), and so removing the false rhetoric that this is only a ‘woman’s question’. 
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